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The Development and Evaluation of
Judicial Review
By C. PERay PATTERsoN
The University of Texas
In the previous portion of this article, Mr. Patterson attributed
the American Revolution to the tyrannies resulting from the failure
of the British government to provide for judicial review of acts of
the central government as well as of the acts of the local govern-
ments. After noting a resulting desire among the former colonists
to substitute constitutional supremacy for legislative supremacy,
Mr. Patterson observed the use of judicial review in the courts of
several of the states prior to the Convention of 1787, pointed out
the embodiment of its principles in the enactments of the Congress
of the Confederation in 1787, and quoted from the journals of the
Convention to show that the theory of judicial review was accepted
by the framers of the Constitution. He now carries his theme into
an appraisal of the Constitution, illustrates how the principles of
judicial review were reaffirmed in the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, and elaborates upon its significance.
8. The Granting of Judicial Review by the
Constitution.
There are two clauses in the Constitution itself which definitely
grant the power of judicial review to both state and federal courts.
The first of these is Article VI, Section 2:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land,
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding."
The latter part of this clause imposes upon the state judges
the duty of sustaining in their decisions the supreme law of the
land in preference to the state constitutions or acts of state legis-
latures. This means that a state judge must nullify a part of his
state constitution or an act of his state legislature, if, in a case
before his court, he should find it to be in conflict with the supreme
law of the land. It is also a part of his duty to nullify an act
of Congress if he should find such an act unconstitutional, because
he takes an oath to sustain only the supreme law of the land. In
other words, he is under no obligation to nullify a part of his
state constitution or an act of his state legislature because they
conflict with an unconstitutional act of Congress. flow can a
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state judge perform this duty if he is denied access to the Consti-
tution of the United States and to Acts of Congress?
It is obvious, therefore, that a state judge is given the power
to declare an act of Congress or an act of his state legislature
or a part of his state constitution unconstitutional if it conflicts
with the Constitution of the United States. Why would a consti-
tution of one government confer the power of judicial review
of its acts upon the judges of another government, yet deny
this power to its own judges? How could the judicial power
of the United States extend to the appellate cases from state courts
involving judicial review without conferring power of judicial
review upon federal courts? The reason why the Constitution
specifically confers judicial review upon the state courts is that
they are agents of other governments which the Constitution of
the United States does not establish. Mvoreover, Congress has
the power to make inferior federal courts out of the state courts.
If this should be done, they would have the power of judicial
review by virtue of the Constitution of the United States and
only the amendment process could take it away from them.
It may well be argued that the fact that the Constitution is
made a fundamental law "ordained and established by the
people" confers the power of judicial review upon the federal
courts, since it has been shown that judicial review was regarded
as an inherent feature of the fundamental law. If the funda-
mental law controlled the Congress, it also controlled the courts
and the executive, The courts, of course, have no chance to
express themselves except in cases. Were they given jurisdiction
over cases arising under the Constitution? Here is where the
other clause of the Constitution comes to the support of the
clause just discussed.
Article III, Section 2 (1), reads as follows:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority."
This clause makes judicial power coextant with legislative power.
What body does the Constitution say shall exercise this power?
Article III, Section 1, says that:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
Since the judges were denied participation in a Council of
Revision, it was understood that they could exercise their power
of judicial review only in "cases." If the judicial power of the
United States had not been vested in the courts alone and had
not been extended to all cases arising under the supreme law
of the land, they would have been denied this power. Now, how
can a federal court decide whether a case arises under the Consti-
tution if the Constitution does not come before the court? It
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is clear that a court could not decide the question of jurisdiction
if it could not consider the Constitution. If the Constitution
confers jurisdiction, it must control the case because the case
exists only by virtue of the Constitution. When the Constitution
comes into court, it controls the court's decision because it is
always the supreme law. Acts of Congress'or treaties have no
validity except when made in pursuance of or under its author-
ity. Congress may repeal its own acts or revoke a treaty, but it
cannot change the Constitution; hence the Constitution is more
fundamental than a constitutional act of Congress or treaty made
under the authority of the United States.
9. Judicial Review Specifically Explained in The
Federalist by Alexander Haimilton
The Federalist papers were written by Hamilton, Jay and
Madison at the time the Constitution was being considered by the
state ratifying conventions. They were published in the news-
papers and circulated throughout the Union. In paper No.
LXXVIII, Hamilton in discussing the reasons for the independ-
ence of the judges says: "The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution.
By a limited constitution I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance,
as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice
no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations
of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."
Further in the same paper he says: "A constitution is, in
fact, and must be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
It, therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legis-
lative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable vari-
ance between the two, that which has the superior obligations
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or in other words,
the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the in-
tention of the people to the intention of their agents."
In paper No. LXXX, Hamilton in speaking of the extent of
judicial authority says: "The states, by the plan of the conven-
tion, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which
are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with
the principles of good government. The importance of duties
on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are speci-
mens of each kind. No man of sense will believe that such pro-
hibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual
power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions
of them. This power must either be a direct negative on state
laws, or an authority in the federal courts to overrule such
as might be in manifest contravention of the Articles of the
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Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter
appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the
former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the states."
These quotations establish a number of important facts: (1)
that the Constitution was intended to be a fundamental law; (2)
that it was to be superior to legislative acts; and that the courts
rather than the sword were to prevent the legislatures of the
nation from substituting their will for that of the people as ex-
pressed in the Constitution. As James Madison said of the
Supreme Court: "Some such tribunal is clearly essential to pre-
vent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact."
10. Judicial Review Approved by the Ratifying
Conventions.
In the debates in the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry, a
rabid states-righter and interested in limitation of the powers
of Congress as a means of preserving the rights of the states,
asked the pointed question if it was understood that the courts
would exercise the power of judicial review. John Marshall, who
was a member of this convention in 1788-15 years before Mar-
bury v. Madison-replied as follows: "If they (the Congress)
were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumer-
ated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of
the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider
such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would
declare it void."
Luther Martin, a delegate to the Federal Convention from Mary-
land, in making his report to the Maryland ratifying convention
called "The Genuine Information" said: "Whether, therefore,
any laws or regulations of the Congress, any act of its President
or other officers, are contrary to or not warranted by the Consti-
tution, rests only with the judges."
In the Connecticut Convention of 1788 Oliver Ellsworth in ex-
plaining how the national government and the states could operate
in the same territory and on the same subject matter said that
a "coercion of law" was provided to make this possible: "If the
general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the
judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United
States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the
Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial, the
national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made
independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the
states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a
usurpation upon the general government, the law is void; and
upright, independent judges will declare it to be so."
Here is the unequivical assertion of judicial review of both
the acts of Congress and those of the states and the statement
that the judges were made independent to enable them to exer-
cise this power impartially.
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In the Pennsylvania Convention of 1787 James Wilson, a dele-
gate to the Federal Convention as well as to the ratifying con-
vention of Pennsylvania in discussing the supremacy of the
Constitution said: "If a law should be made inconsistent with
those powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges,
as a consequence of their independence, and the particular powers
of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and
void; for the power of the Constitution predominates. Anything,
therefore, that shall be enacted by Congress contrary thereto will
not have the force of law."
11. Judicial Review Approved by the First Congress
under the Constitution in 1789.
The Constitution was not self-executing in its judicial provisions.
The system of federal courts had to be established and jurisdiction,
except the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, conferred
upon the courts by Congress even though this task was in some
respects obligatory upon Congress. The task was performed by
the Judiciary Act of September 25, 1789, and marked the com-
pletion of the unfinished work of the Convention.
Several of the delegates to the Federal Convention were Zem-
bers of the Senate and House of Representatives at the time the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed. This Act must be considered
as a contemporary construction of the Constitution made by those
who wrote it and by many others who were conversant with its
principles. Oliver Ellsworth and William Johnson of Connecticut,
Robert Morris of Pennsylvania and William Paterson of New
Jersey-former delegates to the Federal Convention-were mem-
bers of the Senate and voted for the Judiciary Act of 1789. James
Madison, George Wythe of Virginia and Abraham Baldwin of
Georgia, who were members of the House of Representatives also
voted for the act. On June 19, 1789, Baldwin, in a speech to the
House, stated that it was the province of the courts "to decide
upon our laws" and that if they found any law unconstitutional,
they would "not hestitate to declare it so." George Wythe" had
been on the bench of the Court of Appeals of Virginia which had
held an act of the legislature of Virginia unconstitutional in
the case of Commonwealth v. Caton previously cited.
What did the Judiciary Act of 1789 provide with respect tojudicial review? Section 25 of this Act contains the following
provision concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court:
A final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest
court of law or equity of a state in which a decision in
the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exer-
cised under, the United States, and the decision is against
their validity; ... where is drawn in question the con-
struction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a
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treaty or statute of, or commission held under, the United
States, and the decision is against the title, right, privi-
lege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty,
statute, or commission-may be re-examined and reversed
or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States
upon a writ of error.
It is to be noticed here that the Supreme Court is given
power to re-examine, reverse, or confirm decisions of state courts
in which acts of Congress or treaties have been declared of no
effect. How could the Supreme Court confirm such decisions
without holding acts of Congress unconstitutional? In fact, how
could it re-examine, reverse, or confirm without having by impli-
cation the power of judicial review?
12. Judicial Review Approved by State Legislatures
in 1798 and 1799.
It is also very convincing to notice that in 1798 and 1799
when Virginia and Kentucky announced the doctrine of state
nullification of acts of Congress that many state legislatures
called attention to the fact that the courts alone had this power.
The legislature of Rhode Island passed the following resolution:
Resolved, That, in the opinion of this legislature, the
second section of the third article of the Constitution of
the United States, in these words, to-wit---"The judicial
power shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of
the United States"-vests in the federal courts, ex-
clusively, and in the Supreme Court of the United States,
ultimately, the authority of deciding on the constitution-
ality of any act or law of the Congress of the United
States.
The legislature of New Hampshire resolved:
That the state legislatures are not the proper tribunals
to determine the constitutionality of the laws of the
general government; that the duty of such decision is
properly and exclusively confided to the judicial de-
partment.
The legislature of Massachusetts resolved:
That this legislature are persuaded that the decision
of all cases in law and equity arising under the Consti-
tution of the United States, and the construction of all
laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested
by the people in the judicial courts of the United
States.
By summary the following historically established facts con-
cerning judicial review as a principle of the Constitution may be
stated:
1. Judicial review was well known as a principle of law and
constantly practiced by both British and colonial courts prior to
the Revolution.
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2. It was exercised by state courts from 1780 to 1787 as a
principle of a fundamental law after state constitutional su-
preinacy over legislative acts had been established by means of
state constitutional conventions and popular ratification.
3. It was recommended by the Congress of the Confederation
to the states as a means of eliminating conflicts between treaties
and the acts of state legislatures.
4. It was adopted by the Federal Convention as the means of
solving the problems of the coercion of the states and of main-
taining a government of law.
5. It was discussed as a principle of the Constitution by Hamil-
ton and Madison in the Federalist papers.
6. It was discussed and approved in the state ratifying con-
ventions which adopted the Constitution of the United States.
This method of ratification was specifically adopted to make
the Constitution a fundamental law and thus to establish judicial
review. Madison made this explanation on the floor of the
Federal Convention and the Convention adopted it.
7. It was approved by the first Congress of the United States
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
8. It was again approved by state legislatures in the period
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 1798-99. All of this
preceded Marbury v. Madison. It is, therefore, an historical
fact that judicial review is older than the Constitution of the
United States and that it was a nationally known doctrine and
practice of American jurisprudence before the Supreme Court
was even established by Congress and before it had ever touched
the Constitution of the United States. It would, therefore, have
been revolutionary if the Court had not exercised this power in
Marbury v. Madison and would have been tantamount to amend-
ing the Constitution and the usurpation of the powers of the
American people.
The Vanishing Bar
"When $200,000 worth of litigation costs an association member only
$15, lawyers rise up in arms. The Bar rnshes in to prevent natural
progress in the practice of law. Its chief weapon is the hide-bound rule
that corporations cannot act as attorneys. This is applied against auto-
mobile clubs, against collection agencies, against not-for-profit taxpayers;
associations. Even in states where laws expressly permit such organiza-
tions to practice law for the benefit of the public, lawyers find judges
who will reverse the law. As most legislators, all judges, are lawyers,
the public is faced with a tough struggle in getting lawyers to modernize
their methods."
This paragraph, in large boldface type, two columns wide and eight
inches long, heads a three-page article on page 76 of KEN, issue of May 5th.
CAN THE BAR REMAIN MUTE AND UPHOLD ITS DUTY AS AN
ORGANIZATION FOR PUBLIC SERVICE?
